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PACE V. SWERDLOW: CAN EXPERT WITNESSES FACE
LIABILITY FOR CHANGING THEIR MINDS? THE TENTH
CIRCUIT WEIGHS IN ON THE ELEMENT OF PROXIMATE
CAUSE IN A CLAIM OF EXPERT NEGLIGENCE
INTRODUCTION
Expert witnesses are a necessary component of the legal system be-
cause many claims involve technical facts that would be beyond the un-
derstanding of judges and juries without expert testimony.1 Expert wit-
nesses are also pervasive throughout the legal system.2 For example, a
"recent survey of California civil jury trials determined that at least one
expert testified in eighty-six percent of all cases, with two or more op-
posing experts testifying in fifty-seven percent of the trials. 3  Courts,
motivated by a desire to obtain objective expert testimony, have histori-
cally held experts immune from liability based on their activities as ex-
perts.4 However, expert negligence has increasingly become a problem. 5
Thus, courts have recently begun to erode expert immunity and allow
claims against experts for alleged negligence-this trend is particularly
true regarding so-called "friendly" experts (experts subjected to suits
instigated by the same party that retained them).6
Liability for friendly expert negligence is sometimes referred to as
the "Pottery Barn Rule": you break it, you buy it.7 However, it remains
unclear what exactly a friendly expert must do to "break" a case. This is
because friendly expert negligence is a relatively nascent cause-of-action
whose precedent is still "developing, unsettled, lacking in uniformity,
1. Eric G. Jensen, When "Hired Guns" Backfire: The Witness Immunity Doctrine and the
Negligent Expert Witness, 62 UMKC L. REv. 185, 186-87 (1993); see also Steven Lubet, Expert
Witnesses: Ethics and Professionalism, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 465, 465 (1999); Leslie R. Mas-
terson, Witness Immunity or Malpractice Liability for Professionals Hired as Experts?, 17 REv.
LrrIG. 393, 395 (1998).
2. Mary Virginia Moore, Gary G. Johnson & Deborah F. Beard, Liability in Litigation Sup-
port and Courtroom Testimony: Is it Time to Rethink the Risks?, 9 J. LEGAL ECON. 53, 54 (1999);
see also Jensen, supra note 1, at 186-87.
3. Lubet, supra note 1, at 465.
4. Andrew Jurs, The Rationale for Expert Witness Immunity or Liability Exposure and Case
Law Since Briscoe: Reasserting Immunity Protection for Friendly Expert Witnesses, 38 U. MEM. L.
REv. 49, 51-52 (2007); see also Randall K. Hanson, Witness Immunity Under Attack: Disarming
"Hired Guns", 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 497-98 (1996).
5. Moore, Johnson & Beard, supra note 2, at 55.
6. Hanson, supra note 4, at 499 ("Six states have decided recent cases involving lawsuits
against [friendly] expert witnesses. Four of these six states have held [friendly] expert witnesses
accountable for their actions and have narrowly construed the protection of witness immunity."
(footnote omitted)); see also Jurs, supra note 4, at 63.
7. Jurs, supra note 4, at 51.
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and, in many jurisdictions, nonexistent., 8  Consequently, there is little
consensus regarding the elemental requirements necessary to establish a
claim for friendly expert negligence. 9 However, synthesis of the minor
amount of existing case law reveals that such a claim is generally based
upon principles of professional negligence, tort liability, and breach of
contract.10
Generally, to establish a prima facie claim of friendly expert negli-
gence the plaintiff must allege: (1) that the plaintiff was a person to
whom the expert owed a duty of care or with whom there was privity, (2)
the applicable standard of care or contract for services, (3) that the wit-
ness breached the standard of care or breached the contract, (4) that the
conduct of the defendant in failing to use the appropriate standard of care
or in breaching the contract was a proximate cause of the injury or dam-
age of which the plaintiff complains (injury or damage in the context of
friendly expert negligence most often occurs in the form of an adverse
result at a hearing or trial for the party that retained the expert), and (5)
that witness immunity does not apply to the facts and circumstances of
the case in the plaintiff's jurisdiction."
Of the elements, proximate cause is one of the most difficult to es-
tablish. 12 Much of the difficulty surrounding proximate cause arises out
of the discrepancy between the legally prescribed role of experts as ob-
jective translators of technical facts, and the actual (or at least perceived)
role of many friendly experts as advocates for the party that retained
them. 13 While plaintiffs may feel it is the duty of their well-paid friendly
experts to testify in an expected manner and to effectively persuade on
their behalf, no liability exists for friendly experts who simply fail to
"deliver" an expected opinion, or to persuade a judge or jury.14 Thus, for
8. Kathleen L. Daerr-Bannon, Cause of Action for Negligence or Malpractice of Expert




12. MOLLY TREADWAY JOHNSON, CAROL KRAFKA & JOE S. CECIL, EXPERT TESTIMONY IN
FEDERAL CIVIL TRIALS: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 4 (2000), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/
lookup/ExpTesti.pdf/$file/ExpTesti.pdf (citing a survey of federal civil trials, which found that
expert testimony was needed to establish causation and damages in 64% of trials versus the reasona-
bleness of the party's action (34%), and the standard of care owed by a professional (25%)).
13. See Lubet, supra note 1, at 467 ("The single most important obligation of an expert wit-
ness is to approach every question with independence and objectivity."). But see Jeffrey L. Harri-
son, Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current Controls and Proposed Res-
ponses, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 257 (2001) (describing that, in reality, experts "are paid to be
'effective,' but not necessarily to be nonpartisan or even honest"); JOHNSON, KRAFKA & CECIL,
supra note 12, at 6 (citing a survey of federal judges and attorneys who ranked "experts abandon
objectivity and become advocates for the side that hired them" as the most significant problem with
expert testimony in federal civil trials).
14. See, e.g., Schaffer v. Donegan, 585 N.E.2d 854, 860 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) ("'A witness
has a duty to appear and testify truthfully concerning his knowledge or belief.' [A Party] may not
turn that principle to support their argument that they had a fight to expect that [their expert] would
testify as to what [the party] regarded to be the truth, and that his failure to do so constituted a breach
of contract. Fundamentally, no witness can be required to testify... to anything other than the truth
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each claim of friendly expert negligence, a court must inquire as to
whether the alleged negligence arises out of the expert's objective or
contractual duties, or whether the complaint stems merely from the ex-
pert's effectiveness as an advocate. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
engaged in this type of inquiry in the recent case of Pace v. Swerdlow.
15
In Pace, the Tenth Circuit held that a change of opinion by a friend-
ly expert, on the eve of a summary judgment hearing, was not, as a mat-
ter of law, insufficient evidence of proximate cause in a negligence claim
against the expert. 16 The Tenth Circuit reached its decision in Pace, in
part, because facts existed to suggest that the expert's change of opinion
was ill-timed and grounded in fear and intimidation rather than compel-
ling new evidence that had come to light.17
Part I of this Comment provides a broad look at the issues and sig-
nificant cases involving expert witness liability and immunity. Part II
recounts the Tenth Circuit's decision in Pace. Part II analyzes Pace and
offers guidance for future courts in analyzing causation in claims of
friendly expert negligence involving a change of opinion by the expert.
I. BACKGROUND
A. History and Expansion of the Doctrine of Expert Immunity
The Tenth Circuit avoided directly addressing the issue of expert
immunity in Pace. Nonetheless, many of the policy implications under-
lying expert immunity permeate the majority opinion in Pace, as well as
Judge Gorsuch's partial concurrence and partial dissent. Thus, a brief
review of the doctrine of expert immunity is beneficial before evaluating
Pace.
Expert immunity was born out of general witness immunity.' 8 The
touchstone authority concerning witness immunity is the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Briscoe v. LaHue.19 In Briscoe, the Court granted
absolute immunity to fact witnesses in criminal trials--even in the event
of perjury. 20 In general, state and federal courts have interpreted Briscoe
broadly and have expanded immunity to include additional witness cate-
as he sees it .... The same is expected of expert witnesses. While [the party] may have expected
[their expert] would testify in accordance with his previous statements to them . . . that did not
change his paramount obligation to speak the truth.").
15. 519 F.3d 1067 (10th Cir. 2008).
16. Id. at 1074; see also id. at 1075 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
17. See id. at 1075 (majority opinion) ("Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendant's
change of position, as well as the timing of that change of position, proximately caused the state
court's grant of summary judgment ....") (emphasis added); see also id. at 1076 ("Dr. Swerdlow
changed his opinion we are encouraged to surmise, because he feared counsel's 'meanness' and
threat to attack Dr. Swerdlow's medical license.") (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
18. Jurs, supra note 4, at 51-52 (describing the expansion of witness immunity).
19. 460 U.S. 325 (1983).
20. Id. at 345-46.
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gories such as: fact witnesses for their pretrial statements, expert wit-
nesses against suits instigated by the adverse party ("hostile" experts),
expert witnesses appointed by the court, and expert witnesses retained by
all parties.2 '
The rationale underlying the expansion of immunity generally con-
sists of two major policy considerations: (1) that imposing witness lia-
bility may result in witness self-censorship, which in turn could threaten
the fact-finding (and truth-finding) abilities of judges and juries, and (2)
that witness testimony already contains sufficient checks in the form of
the oath to tell the truth, the threat of perjury, the oversight of the trial
judge, and, perhaps most importantly, the process of cross-examination.22
However, despite these policy considerations, granting witness immuni-
ty, particularly expert immunity, is not without problems. The next sub-
section details some of these problems.
B. The Problem of "Hired Guns"
In addition to immunity, experts are additionally protected by the
general absence of any binding standards regulating the quality or truth-
fulness of their testimony. 23 As a result, expert witnesses are often re-
garded as "mercenaries, hired guns, or as witnesses whose opinions are
for sale to the highest bidder," 24 and their testimony is often viewed with
distrust by judges and juries.25 Skepticism surrounding expert testimony
also stems from the economic reality that experts, unlike ordinary wit-
nesses, are engaged in a voluntary-and often very lucrative-
commercial undertaking where market forces influence the type of testi-
mony provided. 26 Professor Jeffrey Harrison summarizes the problem as
follows:
Unlike virtually any other business, expert witnesses are not typi-
cally held accountable in either tort or contract law for their commer-
cial activities. This means that many are inclined to deliver what the
market demands-partisan, biased, or plainly dishonest testimony-
without concern for the costs this testimony may impose on others.
21. Jurs, supra note 4, at 55-60.
22. See, e.g., Jurs, supra note 4, at 56 (analyzing the rationale of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals).
23. See Lubet, supra note 1, at 465-67.
24. Masterson, supra note 1, at 395.
25. Harrison, supra note 13, at 256; see also Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L.
REv. 1113, 1114 (1991). However, despite growing distrust in the objectivity of expert testimony,
there is evidence indicating that expert testimony nonetheless remains significant in determining the
outcome of trials. See Jensen, supra note 1, at 188 (citing studies showing that seventy-one percent
of polled jurors in criminal trials felt expert testimony made a difference in the verdict, and addition-
al studies finding that thirty-six percent of polled jurors in civil trials felt expert testimony "greatly"
influenced the verdict, while only thirteen percent felt the expert testimony made no difference).
26. Harrison, supra note 13, at 314.
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This immunity from the internalization of the social cost of their tes-
timony is hard to reconcile with any moral or economic standard.
27
The combination of immunity and minimal regulation has resulted
in a lack of quality-control regarding expert testimony. Additionally,
many experts are expected-and paid-to be persuasive advocates for
the party that retains them.2 8 Indeed, empirical studies confirm that at-
torneys shop for experts who are good salespersons as well as technically
proficient.29  In response to this problem, many courts have begun to
erode--or at least refuse to expand-expert immunity. 30 This is espe-
cially true regarding friendly experts because courts, in general, have
found the underlying policy arguments for shielding friendly experts less
persuasive than those for shielding hostile experts.3'
C. Reluctance to Expand Immunity to Friendly Experts
Six years after Briscoe, in Bruce v. Byrne-Stevens & Assoc. Engi-
neers, Inc.,32 the Washington Supreme Court-broadly interpreting Bris-
coe and its progeny-became the first court in the country to extend im-
munity to friendly experts.33 However, since Bruce, nearly every court
that has examined the issue has denied immunity to friendly experts.3 4
The general rationale supported by courts rejecting immunity for
friendly experts was articulated by the California Court of Appeals in the
case of Mattco Forge v. Arthur Young & Co., where the court presented
four principal reasons for denying friendly experts immunity: (1) grant-
ing immunity to friendly experts does not encourage them to testify
truthfully, but instead has the opposite effect by shielding negligent ex-
perts from liability; (2) prior case law suggests that witness immunity
exists to protect adverse witnesses from suit by opposing parties after a
lawsuit ends, not to protect one's own experts; (3) a claim against a
friendly expert is analogous to a malpractice claim against a party's at-
torney after a lawsuit, therefore, if witness immunity applied in its
broadest interpretation, attorneys would also be shielded, a notion that no
court would embrace; and (4) many of the judicial system's guarantees
of truthful testimony (e.g. cross-examination) only logically apply to
hostile witnesses.35
27. Id. at 253.
28. Id. at 257; see also Jensen, supra note 1, at 188-89; Lubet, supra note 1, at 468.
29. Harrison, supra note 13, at 262.
30. See Jurs, supra note 4, at 52.
31. Id.; see also Hansen, supra note 4, at 499-500.
32. 776 P.2d 666 (Wash. 1989).
33. Jurs, supra note 4, at 52.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 67-69 (summarizing the rationale of the Califomia Court of Appeals in Mattco).
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II. PACE V. SWERDLOW
36
A. Facts and Procedural History
Angie Putnam died following her breast augmentation surgery at the
Intermountain Health Center ("IHC") in Salt Lake City, Utah.37 After
Putnam's death, her parents and heirs, Thomas A. Pace and Karol Pace,
filed a medical malpractice suit in Utah state court against Putnam's doc-
tors.38 The principal defendant in the suit was Putnam's attending anes-
thesiologist, Dr. Steven Shuput.39 Dr. Shuput discharged Putnam after
her surgery despite allegations that "she was having difficulty breathing
and was experiencing pain of nine on a scale of ten.' '4° Putnam died the
night of her release; the exact cause of her death was never determined.41
Dr. Barry N. Swerdlow, a licensed anesthesiologist, contacted the
Paces' lawyer and offered his services as an expert witness.42 The Paces
retained Swerdlow as their expert and provided him with Putnam's med-
ical records.43 After reviewing the records, Swerdlow's opinion was
recorded in an affidavit, which stated that "based upon a reasonable de-
gree of medical certainty, Dr. Shuput and 1HC Surgical Center did
breach the appropriate standard of care when releasing Angela Putnam
under the circumstances .... "44 Further, Swerdlow suggested that in-
stead of being discharged, Putnam should have been transferred to a
nearby hospital for overnight observation, and that pursuant to a reason-
able degree of medical certainty, "if she had been monitored overnight, it
is very likely that she would be alive today. ' '4 The affidavit also con-
cluded that "as a direct and proximate result of her premature discharge,
Putnam died."46
After recording Swerdlow's affidavit, the Paces' lawyer wrote a let-
ter to Swerdlow requesting that he review Dr. Shuput's written discovery
responses which detailed Dr. Shuput's reasons for discharging Putnam.47
Swerdlow did not ask to alter his own affidavit after reviewing Dr. Shu-
36. 519 F.3d 1067 (10th Cir. 2008).
37. Id. at 1068.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1069 n.1.
40. Id. at 1068.
41. d; see also Pace v. Swerdlow, No. 2:06CV27DAK, 2006 WL 5778247, at *1 (D. Utah
May 23, 2006).
42. Pace, 519 F.3d at 1068-69.
43. Id. at 1069.
44. Id. (quoting Appellate Brief, Exhibit A, at 2, 5, Pace v. Swerdlow 519 F.3d 1067 (10th
Cir. 2008) (No. 06-4157)).
45. Id. (quoting Appellate Brief at 3 15, Pace, 519 F.3d 1067 (No. 06-4157)). This state-
ment was a handwritten correction by Swerdlow to the original sentence composed by the Paces'
lawyer that read: "If she had been monitored overnight, she would be alive today." Id.




put's comments.48 In addition, the Paces' lawyer also provided Swer-
dlow with a copy of Dr. Shuput's deposition transcript.
49
Despite his strong support for the Paces' claim in his affidavit,
Swerdlow was not a strong witness for the Paces at his deposition by Dr.
Shuput's counsel.5° When asked whether he felt it was ethical to testify
against another anesthesiologist without first reviewing that person's
deposition, Swerdlow responded, "I think it would have been good for
me to have seen it, and I did not ask for it. I did not think to ask for it.
And I wouldn't comment upon the ethics thereof., 51 Swerdlow also
stated that he had never testified in trial, and that he was "a relative no-
vice at this whole thing., 52 As to causation, Swerdlow testified that he
could not say within a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Put-
nam would be alive if she had been hospitalized, only that she would
have had an increased probability of survival.53 Swerdlow concluded
that his "ultimate opinion here is that discharging this patient with severi-
ty of pain, as documented in the PACU [Post Anesthesia Care Unit]
record, was not something that a prudent physician in Dr. Shuput's situa-
tion should have done."54 However, Swerdlow also admitted that "Dr.
Shuput was not required under the standard of care to read [Putnam's]
pain score," and that if Dr. Shuput "was reassured that [Putnam's] pain
was moderate, reasonable, then he doesn't need to look at [her pain
score], 55 and "would not have breached the standard of care' 56 if he felt
Putnam was not at that level of pain severity.
Following his deposition, Swerdlow called the Paces' lawyer and
complained that Dr. Shuput's counsel was "mean" and had threatened to
report him to the American Society of Anesthesiologists. Swerdlow
also stated that "he did not want problems with his license. 58 Swerdlow
then asked the Paces' lawyer for a copy of Dr. Shuput's deposition.
59
The Paces' lawyer provided a copy, as well as copies of the depositions
of two IHC nurses. 6° After receiving these documents, Swerdlow cut off
contact with the Paces and their lawyer and-without consulting either
the Paces or their lawyer--composed an addendum to his original affida-
48. Id.
49. Id. Swerdlow claimed he did not receive a copy of Dr. Shuput's deposition transcript
until after his own deposition by Dr. Shuput's counsel; however, because the case came to the Tenth
Circuit as an appeal of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court construed the
facts in the light most favorable to the Paces. Id. n.2.
50. Id. at 1069.
51. Id. (quoting Appellate Brief at 57, Pace, 519 F.3d 1067 (No. 06-4157)).
52. Id. at 1069-70 (quoting Appellate Brief at 55, 65, Pace, 519 F.3d 1067 (No. 06-4157)).
53. Id. at 1070.
54. Id.
55. Id. (quoting Appellate Brief at 58-59, Pace, 519 F.3d 1067 (No. 06-4157)).
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vit in which he directly reversed his support of the Paces' claim, and
instead supported Dr. Shuput's defense.61 Specifically, Swerdlow stated
that it was now his opinion that "Dr. Shuput's care of Ms. Putnam-and
specifically his decision to discharge her from the Intermountain Surgery
Center . . . -was within the standard of care. ' 62 Swerdlow simulta-
neously faxed his addendum to both the Paces' lawyer and Dr. Shuput's
counsel-again without first consulting the Paces or their lawyer-on the
eve of the summary judgment hearing, which Dr. Shuput had filed a mo-
tion for days earlier.63
With the summary judgment hearing only a day away, the Paces at-
tempted to contact Swerdlow about his change of position, but were una-
ble to do so.64 The Paces also sent a letter to Swerdlow demanding that
he repair the damage he had done to their case.65 At the summary judg-
ment hearing, the Paces were granted a brief continuance.66 When Swer-
dlow remained uncooperative, the Paces moved for another continuance,
withdrew Swerdlow as their expert, and filed a motion to designate a
new expert witness.67 The Paces did not file a memorandum opposing
Dr. Shuput's motion for summary judgment.68 The state court denied the
Paces' motions and granted summary judgment to Dr. Shuput.69
The Paces did not appeal the decision, and instead commenced a
suit against Swerdlow, again in Utah state court, alleging that his abrupt
change of position on the eve of the summary judgment hearing caused
the dismissal of their underlying malpractice suit against Dr. Shuput.7°
Specifically, the Paces alleged seven separate claims: (1) professional
malpractice, (2) fraud, (3) negligent misrepresentation, (4) breach of fi-
duciary duty, (5) breach of contract, (6) breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, and (7) negligent infliction of emotional
distress.71
Swerdlow, a California resident, removed the case to federal court
under diversity jurisdiction and filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing three grounds for dismissal: (1) that the doc-
trine of expert immunity barred the Paces from bringing any suit against
him, (2) that all seven of the Paces' claims collectively failed as a matter
of law for lack of proximate cause because his modified testimony was
not the sole or primary reason for dismissal of their underlying case, and
61. Id.












(3) that each of the Paces' seven claims failed individually as a matter of
law on independent grounds.72
The Federal District Court for the District of Utah granted Swer-
dlow's motion to dismiss on all seven claims, holding that his change of
opinion was not the proximate cause for dismissal of the Paces' underly-
ing malpractice case.73 The district court explained that even without his
addendum, Swerdlow's original affidavit was not convincing enough to
withstand summary judgment because it contained conflicting testimony
concerning proximate cause.74 Specifically, the district court concluded
that Swerdlow's statements-"if she had been monitored overnight, it is
very likely that she would be alive today," and "as a direct and proximate
result of her premature discharge, Putnam died"-contradicted each oth-
er and were fatal to the Paces' suit before the addendum.
The district court also found that the Paces' failure to oppose the
motion for summary judgment contributed as much as anything to the
state court granting summary judgment to Dr. Shuput.75 The district
court declined to rule on the controversial issue of friendly expert im-
munity because it presented an issue of first impression under Utah law,
and because the lack of proximate cause was dispositive as a matter of





The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the dis-
trict court, holding (1) that given the procedural posture of the case as an
appeal of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the district court had improperly
drawn critical inferences against the Paces, and (2) that the Paces had
alleged facts that, if proven, would be sufficient to establish the element
of proximate cause in their case against Swerdlow.7 7
Judge Briscoe, writing for the majority, began by explaining the
two-part procedural lens that is employed when considering a dismissal
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6): the court must (1) "accept all the well-
pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and must construe them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff' 78; and (2) "look to the specific
allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support
72. Id. at 1068, 1071-72.
73. Id. at 1072.
74. Id.
75. Id. (quoting Pace v. Swerdlow, 2006 WL 5778247, at *34 (D. Utah May 23, 2006),
rev'd, 519 F.3d 1067 (10th Cir. 2008)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1073.
78. Id. (quoting Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
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a legal claim for relief."79 Given this procedural lens, the court deter-
mined that the district court improperly concluded that the two state-
ments in Swerdlow's affidavit addressing causation-the statements, "if
she had been monitored overnight, it is very likely that she would be
alive today," and "as a direct and proximate result of her premature dis-
charge, Putnam died"-were in conflict.8° Instead, the court concluded
that the phrase "very likely" denoted a high degree of probability, and
thus was perfectly consistent with the later statement concerning prox-
imate cause.8'
The court also held that the Paces had alleged facts that, if proven,
would be sufficient to establish the element of proximate cause in their
case against Swerdlow.82 The court began this portion of its analysis by
reviewing the element of proximate cause under Utah law:
Proximate cause is "that cause which, in natural and continuous se-
quence, (unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the
injury and without which the result would not have occurred. It is the
efficient cause-the one that necessarily sets in operation the factors
that accomplish the injury." 83 Further, there can be more than one
proximate cause of an injury so long as each is a concurrent contri-
buting factor in causing the injury.
84
Under such a standard, the court concluded that Swerdlow's original
affidavit would almost certainly have enabled the Paces to survive Dr.
Shuput's motion for summary judgment.85 Additionally, the court noted
the fact that under Utah law, "it is well established that the question of
proximate cause is generally reserved for the jury," and "only in rare
cases may a trial judge rule as a matter of law on the issue of proximate
causation. 86
The court also noted that under Utah's proximate cause standard,
the Paces were not required to allege facts demonstrating that Swer-
dlow's change of opinion was the proximate cause of the state court's
decision to dismiss their underlying malpractice claim against Dr. Shu-
put, but only that Swerdlow's change of opinion was a proximate cause
of that decision; that is, that Swerdlow's change of opinion was a "con-
79. Id. (quoting Alvarado, 493 F.3d 1210 at 1215).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1074.
82. Id. at 1073.
83. Id. (quoting Steffensen v. Smith's Mgmt. Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 486 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
84. Id. at 1073-74 (citing Anderson v. Parson Red-E-Mix Paving Co., 24 Utah 2d 128, 467
P.2d 45, 46 (1970); Jacques v. Farrimond, 14 Utah 2d 166, 380 P.2d 133, 134 (1963)).
85. Id. at 1074. On this point, the court highlighted the fact that "[tiellingly, Dr. Shuput did
not view the affidavit as being weak. Rather in his motion for summary judgment filed in the medi-
cal malpractice action, Dr. Shuput's proximate cause argument relied upon [Swerdlow's] deposition
testimony-not [Swerdlow's] affidavit." Id
86. Id. (quoting Steffensen, 820 P.2d 482 at 486).
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current contributing factor" to the state court's decision to dismiss their
suit.1
7
The court also rejected the district court's conclusion that the Paces'
failure to file a memorandum in opposition of Dr. Shuput's motion for
summary judgment contributed as much as anything to the dismissal of
their case.88 Under Utah law, expert testimony is required to establish
causation in all medical malpractice cases where the cause of death is not
obvious. 89 Thus, the court concluded that the Paces' omission was irre-
levant because at that point-i.e. following Swerdlow's change of opi-
nion-they were without an expert witness, and only a day away from
the summary judgment hearing.90
Ultimately, the court remanded the case to the district court for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with its opinion.9' The court stated that, on
remand, the district court was free to examine the additional questions
raised by Swerdlow's defense, such as whether each of the Paces' claims
failed independently on other grounds, or whether the Paces' claims were
collectively barred by immunity, including whether the latter question
should be certified to the Utah Supreme Court.92
2. Judge Gorsuch's Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent
Judge Gorsuch authored a partial concurrence and partial dissent to
the majority's opinion.93 As a preliminary matter, Judge Gorsuch con-
curred with the majority's analysis of the proximate cause issue, includ-
ing the majority's conclusion that Swerdlow did not demonstrate, as a
matter of law, that his initial affidavit was so weak or contradictory that
it would have necessarily failed to defeat summary judgment in the Pac-
es' underlying malpractice suit.94 However, Judge Gorsuch recounted
the fact that the court was free to affirm the verdict of the district court
on any ground supported by the record, and stated that the case should
not have been decided on the issue of proximate cause because a review
87. See id.
88. Id.
89. Pace v. Swerdlow, No. 2:06CV27DAK, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32718, at *10 (D. Utah
May 22, 2006).
90. Pace, 519 F.3d at 1075.
91. Id.
92. Id. Swerdlow did in fact bring his case again in the federal district court as a motion to
dismiss based on witness immunity or, alternatively, that the issue of witness immunity should be
certified to the Utah Supreme Court. The federal district court denied Swerdlow's motion to dismiss
based on witness immunity, but granted his motion to certify the issue of witness immunity to the
Utah Supreme Court (Order of the Federal District Court for the District of Utah, Nov. 14, 2008,
available on PACER). However, before the Utah Supreme Court ruled on the certification issue, the
parties settled.
93. Pace, 519 F.3d at 1075.
94. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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of the Paces' complaint revealed several other grounds upon which to
affirm the decision of the district court.95
Judge Gorsuch also expressed concern about the policy implications
of the majority's decision: "[a]llowing this claim to march along sends
the message to would-be expert witnesses: [b]e wary-very wary-of
changing your mind, even when doing so might be consistent with, or
compelled by, the standards of your profession. 96 Additionally, Judge
Gorsuch took issue with the fact that the Paces had never demonstrated
that "another expert, provided with all the information available to Swer-
dlow at the time he changed his opinion, still would've thought Dr. Shu-
put engaged in malpractice," 97 and thus concluded that there existed "no
facts suggesting that any responsible physician, after reviewing the full
record, would've thought Dr. Shuput's conduct constituted malprac-
,,98tice.
Judge Gorsuch further noted that the Paces themselves stated that
the reason for their dissatisfaction with Swerdlow was his failure to "de-
liver" the expert testimony he had promised them all along,99 and warned
of the potential fall-out from creating a precedent that encourages expert
witnesses to "deliver" testimony as opposed to presenting their unbiased
opinions:
Parties already exert substantial influence over expert witnesses,
often paying them handsomely for their time, and expert witnesses
are, unfortunately and all too frequently, already regarded in some
quarters as little more than hired guns. When expert witnesses can be
forced to defend themselves in federal court beyond the pleading
stage simply for changing their opinions-with no factual allegation
to suggest anything other than an honest change in view based on a
review of new information-we add fuel to this fire. We make can-
dor an expensive option and risk incenting experts to dissemble ra-
ther than change their views in the face of compelling new informa-
tion. The loser in all this is, of course, the truth-finding function and
cause of justice our legal system is designed to serve. oo
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1077.
97. Id. at 1076.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1077.
100. Id. Additionally, Judge Gorsuch stated that even if the court were to put aside the lack of
factual allegations related to Swerdlow's misconduct, many of the Paces' claims nonetheless lacked
additional essential elements necessary to survive a 12(b)(6) dismissal. For example, the fact that
the Paces never alleged any fear of physical injury as a result of Swerdlow's conduct, but nonethe-
less asserted a claim of negligent infliction of emotional distress, which, under Utah law, requires an





A. Pace Suggests There are Right and Wrong Ways for Friendly Experts
to Change Their Opinions
In Pace, the Tenth Circuit held that Swerdlow's change of opinion
was not, as a matter of law, insufficient evidence of proximate cause.' 0'
However, importantly, Pace does not suggest that any change of opinion
by a friendly expert is sufficient to establish a prima facie proximate
cause link in a negligence suit against the expert. Clearly, the manner in
which Swerdlow changed his opinion influenced the court's decision, as
did his alleged motivations for the change. 0 2  Specifically, Swerdlow
waited a month to announce his change of opinion, 10 3 and his announce-
ment came on the eve of summary judgment via direct fax to opposing
counsel. °4 Further, allegations existed to suggest that the reasons behind
Swerdlow's change of opinion were grounded in fear and intimidation
rather than in a compelling new piece of medical evidence. 0 5  Had
Swerdlow kept the lines of communication open between himself and the
Paces once he began to doubt his earlier testimony, had he not waited
until the eve of the summary judgment hearing to announce his change of
opinion, and, most importantly, had he refrained from faxing his adden-
dum directly to opposing counsel, the court would undoubtedly have had
a more difficult time concluding that his conduct was potentially action-
able. 1°6
B. Looking Forward
The decision to recognize a cause-of-action for friendly expert neg-
ligence remains a matter of state law, as do the contours of such an ac-
tion. However, the proximate cause analysis in Pace, having come from
the Tenth Circuit, will likely be regarded as considerable persuasive au-
thority when assessing causation in future claims of friendly expert neg-
101. Id. at 1074; see also id. at 1075 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
102. See id. at 1075 ("Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendant's change of position,
as well as the timing of that change of position, proximately caused the state court's grant of sum-
mary judgment .... ") (emphasis added); see also id. at 1076 ("Dr. Swerdlow changed his opinion,
we are encouraged to surmise, because he feared counsel's 'meanness' and threat to attack Dr.
Swerdlow's medical license.") (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
103. Id. at 1069, 1071 (Swerdlow's deposition by Dr. Shuput's counsel was on January 4;
however, he did not fax his addendum until February 11).
104. Id. at 1071.
105. Id. at 1070; see also id. at 1076 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
106. Although it is impossible to know what the Tenth Circuit might have done, it is interesting
to note that the Ohio Court of Appeals, in deciding one of the only other claims of friendly expert
negligence ever to turn on a change of opinion by the expert, held, in part, that the expert's change of
opinion was not the cause of the plaintiffs having to prematurely settle their suit because the expert
(1) changed his opinion based on a new piece of medical evidence that had come to his attention, (2)
reported his change of opinion to his hiring party as soon as he made up his mind, and (3) did not
communicate with the opposing party. See Schaffer v. Donegan, 585 N.E.2d 854, 857, 860 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1990); see also Schaffer v. Donegan, Case No. CA 9108, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 5382, at
*3 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan 21, 1986).
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ligence involving a change of opinion by the expert.1 7 Thus, the ulti-
mate impact of Pace will depend on how the decision is applied in simi-
lar cases in jurisdictions that recognize a cause-of-action for friendly
expert negligence. This section argues that Pace, although correctly de-
cided, should be narrowly interpreted and its application restricted to
cases involving only very similar facts.
In his partial concurrence and partial dissent, Judge Gorsuch voiced
his concern that the majority's decision may discourage future experts
from changing their testimony even when they encounter new evi-
dence.10 8 However, if Pace is applied narrowly, Judge Gorsuch's slip-
pery-slope scenario seems unlikely to develop. This is because, in Pace,
Swerdlow's conduct was more than merely borderline unreasonable-it
was clearly egregious and reckless. 1 9 In particular, Swerdlow's actions
of waiting a month to notify the Paces of his change of opinion, and fax-
ing his addendum on the eve of summary judgment directly to opposing
counsel without first consulting the Paces or their lawyer, were reckless
by almost any standard. Thus, if restricted to the facts, an argument can
be made that Pace places a very limited burden on future friendly experts
who change their opinions-they need only have genuine motivations for
their change of opinion (such as a compelling new piece of evidence that
has come to light), and to avoid clear negligence in communicating such
a change.
If Pace is applied more broadly, however, Judge Gorsuch's fears
seem more realistic. Much of the danger in a broad application of Pace
arises from the potential risk of lawyers shifting responsibility for their
own negligence or malpractice onto friendly experts. For example, an
argument can be made that an expert who fails to return phone calls or
delays in reviewing relevant case documents, and then suddenly changes
his or her opinion as a hearing or trial approaches, is negligent. Howev-
er, an additional argument can be made that a lawyer who fails to moni-
tor and replace such an expert is also negligent-and, in some cases, may
be more responsible than the expert. This is because lawyers, not ex-
perts, are expected to be familiar with the inner workings of the legal
system, and lawyers, not experts, have a duty of zealous representation to
clients. Thus, it should remain the duty of lawyers to choose their ex-
107. Interest in Pace is evidenced by the significant amount of coverage the case received from
tort-related media outlets. See, e.g., Robert Ambrogi, Top 10 Expert Witness Cases of 2008, IMS
ExpertServices, http://www.ims-expertservices.com/newsletters/dec/top-10-expert-witness-cases-of-
2008-120908.asp (last visited Mar. 7, 2009) (naming Pace as the third most significant expert wit-
ness case of 2008).
108. Pace, 519 F.3d at 1077.
109. Indeed, Swerdlow's conduct was likely sufficiently egregious and reckless to constitute
gross negligence, which under Utah law, is defined as "the failure to observe even slight care; it is
the carelessness or recklessness to a degree that shows utter indifference to the consequences that
may result." Pearce v. Utah Athletic Found. 179 P.3d 760, 767 (Utah 2008) (quoting Berry v.
Greater Park City Co., 171 P.3d 442, 449 (Utah 2007)).
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perts wisely, to guide their experts (no matter how experienced) through
the litigation process, and, if necessary, to replace underperforming ex-
perts-even if the experts' behavior might independently be considered
negligent. Therefore, in future claims of friendly expert negligence in-
volving a change of opinion by the expert, the alleged negligence of the
expert in changing his or her opinion should be considered against the
diligence of the lawyer in preparing, guiding, and monitoring the expert.
Only if the negligence of the expert is clearly egregious, and could not
have been reasonably prevented by the lawyer, should the expert's con-
duct be found potentially actionable.
When applied to the facts in Pace, this proposed test supports the
Tenth Circuit's decision. Swerdlow's total collapse at his deposition by
opposing counsel suggests he was ill-informed and ill-prepared by his
own counsel for the experience. Nonetheless, any lack of diligence in
preparing Swerdlow by the Paces' lawyer was superseded by Swer-
dlow's own egregious conduct. That is, even if the lawyers were less
than thorough in preparing Swerdlow, and even if they suspected that he
was having doubts following his deposition by opposing counsel, there
was little reason for them to anticipate that he would do something as
reckless as faxing an addendum to opposing counsel, on the eve of sum-
mary judgment, without first consulting his hiring party's lawyers.
CONCLUSION
Under a narrow reading of Pace, experts are free to change their
opinions in a case, but (1) must do so based on reasonable new develop-
ments in a case (such as compelling new evidence), and (2) must avoid
clear negligence in communicating their change of opinion-an entirely
sensible burden. Thus, if Pace is applied narrowly, no responsible expert
need fear the Tenth Circuit's decision. Further, when evaluating causa-
tion in future claims of friendly expert negligence involving a change of
opinion by the expert, courts should consider the alleged negligence of
the expert in changing his or her opinion against any lack of reasonable
diligence or lack of zealous representation by the plaintiffs counsel, and
should require an act of clearly egregious conduct by the expert, which
could not have been reasonably avoided by the lawyer, in order to recog-
nize the change of opinion by the expert as a potential proximate cause.
This test should be conducted both by the judge at the pleading stages
and, if a trial follows, by a jury in the form of jury instructions. Such a
test is desirable because it synthesizes a principle goal of tort law, that of
shifting losses from less responsible to more responsible parties, with
one of the principle tenets of lawyering, that of zealous representation.
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